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Purpose: The aim of this thesis is to contribute to the existing literature on the 
effect that credit ratings have on the payment choice in M&A 
transactions on the uncovered area of the BRIC countries. 
 
Methodology:  The use and analysis of probit regression to determine whether 
credit ratings have an effect on payment method, inspired by 
Karampatsas et al. (2014). 
  
Theoretical perspective:  The thesis follows a deductive approach. Previous literature consists 
of credit ratings affect on capital structure, optimal capital structure, 
information asymmetry and payment methods in M&A to name a 
few. 
  
Empirical foundation: The sample of the study consists of 294 announced mergers and 
acquisitions in the BRIC countries between the years 2000-2008.   
 
Conclusion: The findings of our study are not significant, thus the thesis cannot 
support a relationship between credit ratings and the choice of 
payment method. However, the study found evidence that theories, 
such as the free cash flow hypothesis, the pecking order theory and 
the market timing hypothesis hold in emerging market countries as 
well.  
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Since the establishment of credit rating agencies in the 20
th
 century the perspective on 
firms from investors and lenders point of view has fundamentally changed. Credit rating 
agencies were introduced to help stakeholders to navigate among firms by producing 
manuals and standards reflecting the firms’ ability to meet their financial obligations. The 
three largest agencies; S&P, Fitch and Moody’s, control roughly 95% of the market 
(Credit when credit’s due, 2014). The main purpose of the credit rating agencies is to 
make an assessment of both firms and sovereigns, measuring their solvency and assign a 
credit rating that reflects their creditworthiness. Moreover, there exist different levels of 
credit ratings. The highest credit rating level indicates that the firm or sovereign is fully 
able to meet its financial obligations and is considered to be safe and stable. On the 
opposite side of the spectra there is the rating with the lowest value indicating poor 
conditions for maintaining the existing financial condition and a great risk of default 
(Standard and Poor’s, 2016). Determining the credit ratings of a firm requires the 
assessment of several variables and developed countries generally have higher ratings 
than countries in emerging markets mainly because of the stable political and economic 
landscape (Borensztein et al., 2007). The establishment of credit rating agencies have 
increased investors’ reliance on the ratings but history has shown that ratings do not 
always show the most accurate picture of a company. This became apparent after the 
global financial crisis in 2008 when credit rating agencies became more questioned and 
regulated, as they seemed to have failed with certain rating assessments whether 
intentional negligence or not. 
 
Firms usually perform merger and acquisitions (M&A) to create synergies and value for 
their shareholders, which could be cost reductions, revenue enhancements or a 
combination of both. Moreover, an M&A could develop new expertise and 
diversification opportunities for the firm (Berk & DeMarzo, 2007). The financing 
decision of the M&A is important since it has an impact on the financial leverage and 
ownership structure of the firm as it affects the firm’s exposure to risk and changes in tax 
and cash flow (Faccio & Masulis, 2005). Several previous studies confirm that the market 
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reacts differently depending on the payment choice, which is generally stocks, cash or a 
mixture of both. For example, when a firm chooses to pay with stocks, it is perceived as a 
negative reaction from the market because it indicates that the firm is overvalued 
(Travlos, 1987; He et al., 2011; Gaughan, 2015).  
 
Previous research have confirmed that credit ratings affect the capital structure and 
financial policies of firms, among them Kisgen (2007, 2006), Bancel and Mittoo (2003) 
and Cursio and Baek (2016). According to these studies, a higher credit rating level 
indicates that firms have better access to financial sources and financing at a lower cost 
of capital. A rather unexplored research area is how credit ratings affect the choice of 
payment method in M&A. Karampatsas et al. (2014) investigated this relationship and 
found that a higher credit rating level indicates the choice of cash as payment method.  
 
1.2 Research problem 
Even though the accuracy of credit rating agencies has been questioned before, credit 
ratings still seem to have great influence on the financing and investment decisions of 
stakeholders and financial markets. Examples of these are credit ratings impact on capital 
structure and financial policy. Several previous studies suggest that by revealing the 
creditworthiness of a firm credit rating agencies mitigate information asymmetry as they 
disclose information to the public without revealing details that could harm the firm’s 
competitive position (Healy & Palepu, 2001; Kisgen, 2007; Karampatsas et al., 2014). 
Thus, the credit rating agencies are important in financial markets to communicate a more 
accurate view of the firm’s current state. Credit ratings effect on the firm’s capital 
structure is a well-covered research area. Bancel and Mittoo (2003) found that credit 
ratings are one of the most important determinants in the choice of capital structure 
because an upgrade sends signals to the public about the increased state of the firm. The 
upgrade automatically leads to better financial sources to invest in new projects, whilst a 
downgrade leads to the opposite. Firms close to a downgrade therefore work hard to 
avoid the situation (Kisgen, 2007).  
 
Moreover, Kisgen (2007) found that firms devote attention to credit ratings when 
designing their financial policy as the choice of payment method sends signals to the 
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public. As mentioned above, if the firm uses stocks for instance, the public reacts 
negatively to the announcement due to the indication of that the firm is overvalued 
(Travlos, 1987; He et al., 2011; Gaughan, 2015). The theory assumes that the market is 
aware of the significance of management’s announcement to use stocks to finance a deal. 
As a result, when the market interprets the negative signal that management believes the 
firm is overvalued, the stock price of the bidder should therefore weaken upon 
announcement of the deal. Using cash, on the other hand, signals that a firm holds a lot of 
free cash flow (Jensen, 1986). Previous researchers argue that cash is preferred as 
payment method when the firm is correctly valued or undervalued (Chemmanur et al., 
2009; Karampatsas et al., 2014).  
 
Most of previous research about the choice of payment method in M&A cover developed 
countries, more specifically the US and European market. Among them, Faccio and 
Masulis (2005) studied the choice of payment method in European M&A where the 
authors found that corporate governance and debt-financing constraints affect the choice 
of payment method in M&A. More recently, Karampatsas et al. (2014) introduced credit 
ratings as new determinants of the payment method used and found that bidders in the US 
holding a higher credit rating level are more likely to use cash as payment method. 
However, they did not find a significant relationship that firms holding a credit rating are 
more likely to use cash as payment method than unrated firms.  
 
There is limited research covering the choice of payment method in M&A in emerging 
markets. Most of the existing literature that cover the subject in emerging markets 
investigate stock reactions to the announcement of an M&A, among them Chi et al. 
(2011). Sehgal et al. (2012) added stock reactions to the choice of payment method in 
their research. Burns and Liebenberg (2011), on the other hand, compared emerging 
markets to developed markets and found that stock is a more common choice of payment 
method in developed markets, while a mixture of cash and stock are more common in 
emerging markets. However, we have not found any study covering credit ratings affect 
on payment method in emerging markets. Emerging market acquirers became more 
noticeable in the beginning of the 2000s (Gaughan, 2015). In the Goldman Sachs report 
titled “Building Better Economies BRICs”, Jim O’Neill first presented the acronym 
“BRIC economies”. The report highlighted the growing importance of Brazil, Russia, 
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India and China in the world economy and how their set of GDP was expected to rise 
during the forthcoming years. The popularity of the report made the acronym world 
known and helped inflows of foreign investments into these markets. Since the release of 
the report, emerging markets are often associated with the four BRIC countries. 
Throughout the years, further countries have been added to expand the acronym. 
Nonetheless, we believe that the original formation of the BRIC countries will give us a 
diverse and important group to investigate, as they are the largest countries in emerging 
markets
1
. The four countries’ combined GDP account for approximately 50% of the total 
GDP in emerging markets during the tested period (2000-2008) and 66% of total GDP in 
these markets in 2015, see table 1. Moreover, these countries account for approximately 
75% of emerging markets total population and accounted for 38% of all emerging 
markets deals between the years 2000-2008, see appendix 8.1. Therefore, by using these 
four economies in our study we expect to be able to fill the research gap on emerging 
markets with a study on credit ratings affect on the choice of payment method in M&A.  
 
  
Table 1. The BRIC units’ GDP percentage of total GDP for all emerging countries. The tested 
period 2000-2008 is illustrated in white and the most recent complete year 2015 is illustrated in 
red.  
 
                                                        
1
 Emerging countries are based on the MSCI Emerging Markets Index. For further 
information of included countries see appendix 8.1. 
44% 46% 45% 46% 
47% 49% 
50% 
53% 
56% 
66% 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2015
BRIC GDP (%) of Emerging Markets 
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Emerging markets are usually more regulated and have a higher degree of information 
asymmetry in the financial markets compared to more developed countries (Salter, 1998). 
A higher degree of information asymmetry is proven by several researchers to have a 
significant effect on a firm’s investment decision. For instance, Drobetz et al. (2009) 
found that firms hold less cash under such circumstances. Also, Zhu and Jog (2009) 
found that firms prefer to pay with stock and lower levels of cash under a higher degree 
of information asymmetry. Therefore, we find it interesting to investigate if these 
circumstances will leave us with results different from previous studies made on 
developed markets.  
 
Ultimately, there is an inadequate amount of previous work available about M&A events 
in emerging countries and not one covering credit ratings importance when choosing 
payment method. Moreover, there has not been any published article specifically 
covering the topic credit ratings and payment method outside of the US. In addition, the 
only published article by Karampatsas et al. (2014) did not find a significant relationship 
between the existence of credit rating and the choice of payment method. Therefore, we 
aim to investigate this relationship further and to fill the existing research gap by 
providing evidence from emerging markets. The methodology and variables used in this 
thesis are inspired by the work of Karampatsas et al. (2014) in order to be able to perform 
a comparable study. 
 
1.3 Research question 
Based on our research problem we have established the following research question:  
 Do credit ratings on acquirers affect the choice of payment method in M&A in the 
BRIC countries?  
 
1.4 Purpose 
This thesis aims to examine whether the choice of payment method is affected by credit 
rating existence when performing an M&A in the BRIC countries, namely Brazil, Russia, 
India and China. This thesis will contribute to existing research covering the choice of 
payment method in M&A by adding evidence from emerging markets with additional 
insights and perspective in this uncovered area of research.  
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1.5 Limitations 
Due to the lack of time and limited access to databases, a number of limitations must be 
outlined to successfully be able to perform the study. First of all, this study covers the 
four largest countries and economies in the emerging markets: Brazil, Russia, India and 
China (Mainland). The chosen BRIC unit includes four countries from four different 
continents, which gives us a diverse sample including different governance systems and 
regulations. Secondly, a restriction on the time period we aim to investigate is made. The 
data collected to investigate our research question are M&A announcements gathered 
from the time period 1/1/2000-31/12/2008. This period is chosen partly because of the 
increased M&A activity in emerging markets in the beginning of the 2000s, and partly to 
make sure to include the complete sixth and last M&A wave (Gaughan, 2015). By 
including the complete sixth M&A wave in the chosen time period we will receive a 
more representative result as it includes all of the steps in a financial cycle. Moreover, at 
the beginning of the chosen time period the BRIC acronym was established and therefore 
the BRIC unit will be interesting to investigate as it represented, and still represents, the 
largest economies of emerging markets. In our chosen time period empirical evidence 
have proven that financial markets rely on credit rating agencies (Sy, 2009). The financial 
crisis is therefore excluded from our sample since the period led to scepticism from the 
public about the role and behaviour of the credit rating agencies. Consequently, including 
the financial crisis in our sample could have left the thesis with biased results. The 
description of data limitations is more thoroughly explained in the “Data selection 
criteria” chapter of this thesis.   
2. Literature review and theoretical framework  
2.1 Credit ratings affect on capital structure 
Research has shown that many companies devote considerable attention to credit ratings 
when designing their financial policy. As mentioned in the introduction chapter, a higher 
level of credit rating can lead to direct benefits for a company’s shareholders through the 
perks of lower cost of debt for their funding, an expansion of the pool of eligible 
investors and more favourable terms from other corporate stakeholders which is 
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reassured by the firm’s implied staying power (Kisgen, 2007). Also, Tang (2009) found 
evidence for the relationship of an upgrade and decreased cost of borrowings. The choice 
of capital structure policy must be designed to fit the circumstances of the particular firm. 
Companies that rely on the commercial paper market or operate in industries where credit 
ratings are important for customer relationships will almost certainly work hard to 
maintain high credit ratings. However, the normal case is that firms work harder to 
maintain its existing credit rating, i.e. avoiding a downgrade, rather than to focus on 
receiving a higher rating. In another study, Kisgen (2006) found that companies close to a 
change in credit rating level issue less debt than companies that are not close to a change 
in credit rating level. The relationship is further strengthened by Cursio and Baek (2016) 
who explain the firms’ behaviour as a consequence of that the benefits incurred from a 
credit upgrading do not correspond to the high costs that can occur from a downgrading. 
The underlying argument for the hypothesis that firms care more about a downgrading 
than upgrading in credit rating level can be explained by debt covenant violations and 
restrictions. When firms are unable to meet the requirements from debt covenants they 
lose their access to sources of funding and a credit downgrading could easily decrease a 
firm’s ability to comply with debt covenants (Roberts & Sufi, 2009). However, there 
exist studies that show the opposite or no significant results whether firms’ capital 
structure is affected by credit ratings or not. Among them, Kemper and Rao (2013) found 
that capital structure decisions are not primarily affected by credit ratings. Firms do not 
adjust their leverage levels to improve their credit rating and thus ratings are not 
perceived as an important determinant in their case. 
  
Graham and Harvey (1999) did a comprehensive study on the practice of corporate 
finance. They found that in the course of keeping a strong policy regarding financial 
flexibility firms seem to be keen on preserving that flexibility and keep a high rating 
when they issue debt. Moreover, Bancel and Mittoo (2003) performed a study on the 
determinants of the choice of capital structure on firms. Their findings covered the 
European market and they discovered that more than half of the firms did not have credit 
ratings for their debt. Nevertheless, their study confirmed that credit ratings and target 
ratios are an important subject for managers and that credit ratings are perceived to be 
one of the most important determinants in the choice of capital structure. When choosing 
the right amount of debt in their firms 72 % of the managers that Bancel and Mittoo 
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(2003) studied confirmed that credit ratings are important or very important determinants. 
They found that managers primarily focused on financial flexibility, credit rating and 
interest tax savings when choosing debt structure in the company. 
  
Despite its significant importance credit rating agencies have been criticized for causing 
the financial crisis in 2008 and lost popularity in the happening. Sy (2009) illustrates that 
financial markets rely on ratings and as a result this has led to great losses and illiquidity 
issues. The author also suggests that firms should increase capital and liquidity to be able 
to adhere to the systematic risk that lies in ratings. There are however benefits that are 
driven from credit ratings such as solving the issues of information asymmetry, which 
will be more deeply covered below.  
 
2.2 Optimal capital structure 
Traditional capital structure theories typically include the trade-off theory and the 
pecking order hypothesis. Modigliani and Miller (1958) suggest that in perfect and 
efficient markets, the capital structure is irrelevant. However, the traditional trade-off 
theory indicates that a unique optimal structure exists for a given firm. The unique 
optimal capital structure is the result of finding the right balance between the benefits of 
debt and the costs of debt. The benefits of debt usually refer to the tax-deductible interest 
payments and the ability to control how the manager spends free cash flow. The costs of 
debt, on the other hand, represent the present value of expected direct and indirect costs 
of bankruptcy (Kisgen, 2007). 
  
On the contrary, Myers (1984) suggests that there is no optimal capital structure and that 
firms instead follow a pecking order in corporate financing. Managers prefer the least 
risky alternative when seeking for financing sources. In other words, the corporate 
financing ranges from internal financing/retained earnings, followed by debt and lastly 
equity. This corporate financing behaviour is the consequence of information asymmetry. 
The author argues that the market is under informed about the value of the project that a 
firm brings to the market, hence the market tends to undervalue the project and the 
securities issued to finance it. By using internal financing, the firm avoids the surrender 
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of value. Therefore, firms tend to maintain financial slack to pursue profitable projects at 
any time (Ogden et al., 2003).  
 
Several studies have tested these theories against each other to see which one is dominant 
over the other. Along this line of theory, Lemmon and Zenger (2010) discovered that the 
pecking order theory exists for sources of financing which means that firms prefer to use 
internal cash primarily. On the other hand, when external financing is necessary, equity 
becomes less preferred than debt. To conclude, their study does not support the trade-off 
theory as their study suggests that low-levered firms that are highly profitable use internal 
cash for sources of financing. Among emerging markets, Tong and Green (2005) studied 
corporate financing decisions of the largest listed Chinese companies and found support 
for the pecking order hypothesis over the trade-off theory. Chen (2004) also studied 
Chinese companies to explore the determinants of capital structure, however the author 
did not find support for neither the trade-off theory nor the pecking order hypothesis. The 
author instead suggests that Chinese firms seem to follow a “new pecking order” in the 
order: retained profit, equity and long-term debt. The author argues that the results 
depend on the significant institutional differences and financial constraints in the banking 
sector in China, in comparison to Western countries, which influences firms’ leverage 
decisions.  
  
2.3 Asymmetric information, agency theory and signalling theory 
Information asymmetry arises when management is better informed about the true value 
of the firm than the public. The management of a firm must be careful about what 
information to release in order to make sure that strategic plans are not leaked to 
competitors. Leaked information to competitors would hamper the firm’s ability to 
compete and consequently reduce the firm’s value (Ogden et al., 2003). According to 
Salter (1998), emerging markets appear to have higher information asymmetry than 
developed markets. Palepu et al. (2005) argue that the absence of reliable specialized 
intermediaries and regulatory systems, such as credit rating agencies and financial 
analysts are important reasons for the higher information asymmetry in emerging 
countries compared to more developed countries. Patel et al. (2002) investigated 
information asymmetry in emerging markets and found that transparency and disclosure 
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is significantly higher in Asian emerging markets together with South Africa compared to 
Latin American, Eastern European and Middle Eastern emerging markets. Moreover, in 
China information asymmetry is often associated with the stock market and that foreign 
investors receive a stock discount when investing in the Chinese stock market. According 
to Chakravarty et al. (1998) one common explanation is that foreign investors have an 
informational disadvantage relative to domestic investors, hence they receive a discount 
on their shares.  
 
Several studies indicate that credit rating agencies mitigate asymmetric information. 
Healy and Palepu (2001) argue that credit rating agencies disclose information to the 
public, which alleviates information asymmetry and thus lowers the firm’s cost of capital. 
More recently, both Kisgen (2007) and Karampatsas et al. (2014) found support for credit 
rating agencies ability to mitigate information asymmetry as credit ratings disclose 
information to the public through the creditworthiness of a company. Consequently, the 
public domain gains a more accurate view of the firm’s current state. Moreover, Tang 
(2009) found that credit market information asymmetry significantly affects firms’ 
financing and investment decisions.  
 
Schwarcz (2002) argues that credit ratings are not as reliable as available information 
since they are based on the information given by the issuer and do not include the 
potential risk of fraudulent behaviour of the rated firm. Also, credit rating agencies’ 
reputations matter as they work as intermediaries between the firm and the public. 
Another potential problem with credit rating agencies relying solely on information 
provided by the issuer makes it crucial that credit rating agencies treat all firms equally. 
Gan (2004) investigated if credit rating agencies make consistent assessments when 
providing ratings for firms, regardless if the issuer pays for the service or not. The author 
found that credit rating agencies give significantly lower ratings to unsolicited issues, i.e. 
issuers who do not pay for the service. The author’s result also illustrates the difficulties 
in today’s “issuer-pays” model as it creates agency conflicts in the market. Credit rating 
agencies, issuers and investors all contribute to this agency conflict. Before the “issuer-
pays” model became a standard, another model was used called “subscriber-pays”. In the 
latter model, investors paid the credit rating agencies a monthly fee to get access to firms’ 
credit ratings. However, in the 1970’s the credit rating agencies found new ways to 
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receive revenues and created the “issuer-pays” model. In other words, the conflict arises 
from that the issuer, and not the investors, pays the credit rating agencies. Hence, the 
issuer chooses credit rating agency based on the credit rating level received and whether 
investors will see the rating as valuable or not. Furthermore, another conflict of interest is 
that credit rating agencies also provide consulting services to their clients, which 
potentially questions how credit rating agencies can remain unbiased during such 
circumstances (Voorhees, 2012). Controversially, the information asymmetry that is 
present in the market makes an opportunity for the issuer to provide self-selected 
information to the credit rating agency in order to receive a rating. Therefore, credit 
rating agencies are not as reliable as the information available (Schwarcz, 2002).  
 
Pagano and Volpin (2010) suggest that to mitigate these problems credit rating agencies 
should be paid by investors rather than issuers, i.e. go back to the “subscriber-pays” 
model. Furthermore, credit rating agencies should have free access to loans or securities 
that underlie the debt products. They also argue that if the “issuer-pays” model would 
retain, it should be revised and require issuers to pay an upfront fee irrespective of the 
rating to avoid a financial crisis like the one in 2008. Covitz and Harrison (2003) studied 
the conflict of interest at bond rating agencies and how it influences their actions, if they 
are more likely to favour issuers’ interests rather than investors’ interests. The authors 
found no empirical evidence that supports that the conflict of interest impacts the 
decision of the credit rating agency. Nor did they find that credit rating agencies would 
act in the interest of the issuer. Instead, they found proof of credit rating agencies to 
favour investors’ interests and that credit rating agencies appear to be relatively 
responsive to reputation concerns. Bolton et al. (2012) suggest that upfront disclosure 
combined with mandatory disclosure of any rating produced by credit rating agencies can 
mitigate the conflict of interest.  
 
John and Nachman (1985) discuss information asymmetry in relation to the 
underinvestment problem, i.e. when a firm has default-risky debt outstanding and a 
profitable investment opportunity that must be financed with equity if undertaken. The 
authors found that credit ratings reduce the levels of underinvestment. Reputation works 
as a signal for firm quality and hence reputation mitigates information asymmetry. This 
statement is in line with Akerlof’s (1970) popular study about how to mitigate 
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information asymmetry in the market, where he uses credit markets to illustrate his 
points. He argues that investigating the past records or the reputation of the borrower can 
help screening potential borrowers more effectively. John and Nachman (1985) found 
that if a firm has a good reputation it would invest more and hence reduce the 
underinvestment problem. They also found a link between reputation and credit ratings, 
expressing that a firm with a good reputation has a higher credit rating level and 
consequently issue bonds at higher prices. Ultimately, credit ratings are a way of 
disclosing the quality of the firm to the market. 
 
Signalling theory derives from information asymmetry and illustrates when two parties 
have different access to information. Typically, the sender must decide how to 
communicate that information and the receiver must decide how to interpret it (Connelly 
et al., 2011). Moreover, according to the signalling theory specific characteristics and 
actions of a firm can be interpreted as signals to the public about the current state of the 
firm. Credit ratings are, as mentioned above, one way of disclosing information to the 
public. He et al. (2011) found that a change in bond rating impacts the information 
asymmetry of stock trading and found support for the signalling theory. The authors 
argue that an upgrade sends signals to the investors about a change in the firm’s financial 
state. The investors receive the signal and interpret it as good news and subsequently 
modify their outlooks of the firm’s future performance. Moreover, the capital structure of 
a firm is also affected by information asymmetry. As previously mentioned, Drobetz et 
al. (2009) found results indicating that a firm holds less cash when under a higher degree 
of information asymmetry. Zhu and Jog (2009) found a strong relationship between 
information asymmetry and the size of the acquisition premium in their study of 
emerging market firms. The results indicate that under higher levels of information 
asymmetry, acquiring firms use higher levels of stock and lower levels of cash financing. 
The authors argue that firms pay higher premiums to access more valuable private 
information and as a result mitigate information asymmetry problems.  
 
Additionally, the management’s choice of payment method in an M&A can send signals 
to the public. Travlos (1987) found significant differences in the abnormal returns 
between stocks and cash offerings as payment method in a takeover. The author argues 
that the reason for the significant difference is that shareholders perceive stock financing 
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as negative information as it implies that the bidding firm is overvalued. Chemmanur et 
al. (2009) also found evidence supporting the signalling theory. They found that bidders 
are more likely to use stock payment in M&A when the firm is considered overvalued 
and cash offers when correctly valued. Moreover, Vermaelen and Xu (2014) found 
evidence for what they refer to as the market timing hypothesis, which indicates that 
bidders have incentive to pay with stocks when their stocks are overvalued.  
  
2.4 Payment method in M&A 
The capital structure of the company affects how it chooses to finance new projects. In 
line with the contribution of the pecking order theory Myers and Majluf (1984) showed 
results that managers have a tendency to use stock financing for investments due to 
information asymmetry where the managers have superior information. This is in line 
with choosing the less risky alternative. On the other hand, Jensen’s free cash flow 
hypothesis indicates that firms with a lot of free cash flow, internally generated cash, 
would preferably choose cash as payment method in a merger and acquisition. However, 
there exists a risk of empire building from managers in firms with large amounts of 
internal cash. The empire building refers to the tendency that a firm might invest in an 
redundant amount of projects simply by spending money due to having free cash flow in 
excess (Jensen, 1986).  
  
Faulkender and Petersen (2006) investigated how firms choose their capital structure and 
suggest that access to public debt markets impact the firm’s capital structure. As a result, 
these firms have 35% more debt in their capital structure compared to firms not having 
access to public debt markets. The authors assert the differences between the cost of 
public and private debt. Harford and Uysal (2014) add to these findings and use debt 
ratings to specify bond market access and investigate whether access to debt markets 
affect investment decisions. The authors found that rated firms are more likely to perform 
M&A than unrated firms. Further, they found that rated firms pay higher premiums in an 
M&A and receive lower stock price reactions to their announcement than unrated firms. 
The authors conclude that the lack of access to debt markets does indeed affect a firm's 
investments. It also affects the quality of those investments by creating underinvestment 
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problems as managers have to be more selective in their investments and cannot go 
through with all positive NPV projects.  
 
Faccio and Masulis (2005) studied M&A payment choices on the European market 
during the years 1997-2000. The authors found that corporate governance concerns and 
debt-financing constraints have a large impact on the bidder’s payment choice and that 
several deal and target characteristics affect the choice of payment method in M&A. 
Accordingly they argue that bidder’s corporate control threats discourage stock financing 
while financing constraints and weaker financial conditions encourage stock financing. 
Besides, the corporate control mechanism increases the incentives to use cash financing 
when the voting power ranges between 20-60 % and when the voting control is 
weakened. Karampatsas et al. (2014) added credit ratings to the subject to measure debt 
capacity and credit quality. The authors studied the US market between the years 1998-
2009 and found that a bidder’s holding a higher credit rating level are more likely to use 
cash as payment method. However, the authors found no significant relationship between 
credit rating existence and the use of cash in M&A.  
  
Harford et al. (2009) performed a study on 1188 acquisitions and came up with the results 
that acquisitions had the ability to alter the bidders capital structure. Entering an 
acquisition the bidders have a target capital structure and to maintain that target level, 
bidders make sure to alter and adjust the financing structure of the bid. For instance, 
when the target level is not met due to excessive leverage, then the payment method in 
the acquisition is more likely to be financed through equity rather than debt. Similar 
results were derived from the study of Uysal (2007). The study contributed to the 
literature about target capital structure. However, the authors found results showing that 
firms with excessive leverage more likely would use debt in their offers if they even 
would consider performing acquisitions. 
 
As mentioned above, the choice of payment method in M&A have been covered in 
several studies. However, Karampatsas et al. (2014) were the first to add the variable 
credit rating into their study. Even though research about the subject exists, research 
covering markets outside the US and European markets are rare and infrequent. Sehgal et 
al. (2012) investigate how M&A announcements and the choice of payment method 
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affect stock returns for the BRICKS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Korea, South 
Africa) countries during the period 2005-2009. The authors used an event study for the 
purpose and found significant pre-event returns for 5 out of 6 countries in their sample. 
The authors argue that the results are explained by possible leakages in the information 
system in emerging markets. India, South Korea and China had significantly negative 
post-event returns while South Africa had strong positive returns. The authors also found 
evidence supporting stock financed mergers are value creating, while cash financed 
mergers are value destroying in the short run. Chi et al. (2011) performed the first 
comprehensive study on M&A in China and examined bidders of 1148 M&A during the 
period 1998-2003. The authors found significantly positive abnormal returns before and 
upon M&A announcements. Furthermore, they found that the dominant payment method 
is cash. According to the authors, a potential explanation to the dominant usage of cash 
financing could be the country’s share segmentation system and China Securities 
Regulatory Commission (CSRC); regulation on the issuance of shares, which makes it a 
hinder to value shares. In the study made by Burns and Liebenberg (2011) the results 
suggested that the method of payment generally differs no less in M&A in emerging 
markets from that of developed countries. However, their study did show some difference 
between public targets in the countries. The use of stock was more significantly used for 
public targets in M&A of developed countries while M&A in emerging markets were 
more commonly financed through a mixture of cash and equity. 
 
2.5 Critical reflections  
The previous literature and theoretical framework provide a solid basis for the 
understanding of the subject we aim to further investigate. Nonetheless, it is important to 
critically analyse their respective relevance to our thesis. First of all, the previous studies 
are based on different assumptions and limitations. Remarkably large parts of the 
research were performed in developed markets with a majority in the US and European 
market. It is important to take into consideration the possible differences in our results 
compared to more developed markets. Developed markets usually allow better access to 
data and allow more transparent financial markets than less developed countries. This 
could therefore limit the data available for our study, which could demand certain 
adjustments. Furthermore, the time period in which each study was performed is an 
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important factor in the analysis of its results. Information and technology changes 
substantially throughout the years and are different between more developed countries 
and emerging markets. Among the previous literature, only Karampatsas et al. (2014) 
investigate the relationship between credit ratings and the choice of payment method in 
an M&A. However, they investigate the US market which differs significantly from the 
markets we aim to study. The differences in preconditions and assumptions are important 
to keep in mind when analysing the outcome of our results.   
 
To conclude, there exists a broad amount of previous published articles covering credit 
ratings, capital structure and payment methods in M&A. However, only one of them 
covers the credit ratings affect on the choice of payment method. The area is therefore 
relatively unexplored and in need of further research to provide evidence from other 
markets. 
 
2.6 Hypotheses 
Based on the theoretical framework and previous literature described above we have 
decided to test the following hypotheses: 
 
Null hypothesis (H0): Rated acquirers are not more likely than unrated acquirers to use 
cash as payment method in M&A.   
 
Alternative hypothesis (H1): Rated acquirers are more likely than unrated acquirers to use 
cash as payment method in M&A.   
3. Data and methodology 
3.1 Research approach 
In order to answer our research question we will perform a quantitative study with a 
deductive approach. A deductive approach implicates that the research is firmly anchored 
in theory (Bryman & Bell, 2005). In this thesis, we apply pre-existing research and 
theories to analyse credit ratings implication on the choice of payment methods in M&A. 
We use a probit regression to test our developed hypotheses. Furthermore we use a 
Hausman test and a TSLS regression to test the robustness of our results. This approach is 
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in line with the deductive approach, which implicates the use of relevant theories in order 
to define research questions and hypotheses. Previous literature is thus used when testing 
the hypotheses after receiving the results. The hypotheses are consequently either rejected 
or failed to be rejected (Bryman & Bell, 2005). Furthermore, in order to answer our 
research question we will use purely quantifiable data. Hence, we will apply a 
quantitative approach with the use of EViews.  
 
3.2 Data selection criteria 
As mentioned above, this thesis applies a quantitative approach. The data sources used in 
a quantitative study can be either primary or secondary. Primary data is collected directly 
by the researcher and secondary data is collected by other than the researcher (Bryman & 
Bell, 2005). Our study is solely based on secondary data collected from several 
databases: Zephyr, Thomson Reuters Eikon, Datastream and Capital IQ. The use of 
secondary data is less reliable than primary data. However, Bryman and Bell (2005) 
argue that secondary data is often of high quality as it is usually collected from solid 
databases. The databases we use to collect information are well established and used both 
by researchers and labour within the financial industry. Additionally, we use information 
from different sources to complement with information to the study, hence this makes the 
information more solid as we do not solely rely on one database.  
 
The purpose of this thesis is to be able to find results from emerging markets. We have 
chosen the four largest economies in emerging markets: Brazil, Russia, India and China 
(Mainland). As seen in table 1, the BRIC unit alone stands for 66 % of the GDP in 
emerging markets in 2015 and for approximately 50 % of the GDP in emerging markets 
at the time period tested. As mentioned in the introduction chapter, the report about the 
BRIC countries highlighted the growing importance of Brazil, Russia, India and China in 
the world economy and how their set of GDP was expected to rise. This report was 
published during our tested period and the BRIC unit alone, represented 38 % of all 
M&A performed by emerging markets throughout the tested period, see appendix 8.1.  
 
The M&A activity and deal characteristics in Brazil, Russia, India and China (Mainland) 
are collected from Zephyr. In order to be able to compare our results to Karampatsas et 
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al. (2014) we perform a number of constraints based on the authors’ requirements. 
Primarily, the data covers characteristics and variables on the acquirers whilst 
information on the target firms is limited due to lack of information and data. Secondly, 
the M&A needs to be announced and completed during the years 2000-2008. Thirdly, the 
deal is classified as a merger or acquisition, which means that asset sales, capital 
increase, joint venture, liquidations, share buyback, leverage buybacks, reverse takeovers, 
privatizations and management buy-out are excluded from the sample. Furthermore, the 
deals are domestic. This is partly to be able to get a comparable result to the US market 
and partly to be able to focus solely on the four markets we have chosen to study. This 
results in a sample of 14 936 deals.  
 
Moreover, deal characteristics such as information about the payment method and deal 
value have to be available. The deal value has to be larger than 1 million USD and the 
acquiring firm must exceed 50 % ownership in order to gain control over the target firm. 
Additionally, the acquiring firm has to be listed in the country and the targets are both 
private and public firms. Both successful and unsuccessful M&A are included in the 
sample. After the outlined constraints, the sample is reduced to 508 deals.  
 
Both rated and unrated firms are used in our sample. Credit ratings are collected from the 
three major rating agencies: Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch, through the database 
Thomson Reuters Eikon. Karampatsas et al. (2014) solely study the US market and 
therefore use the domestic rating. Opposed to the authors we use the foreign long-term 
issuer rating to get a comparable rating among the four countries of interest in our 
sample. The firm specific details and accounting data are collected from Datastream and 
Capital IQ. Due to the lack of information and accounting data, the sample is finally 
reduced to 294 deals, 53 of these deals have rated acquirers and 241 deals have unrated 
acquirers. This resulted in a loss of 214 deals that could contain important information 
and therefore the loss could lead to biased results. The original sample of 508 deals 
would have given us a more accurate representation for the BRIC countries.  
 
The country distribution of the sample is presented in table 2. The most number of deals 
is from China. The explanation for this could arguable be the size of the country as it is 
the largest economy both when it comes to both GDP growth and M&A activity. We will 
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study the four countries as one unit in our analysis and make conclusions for BRIC as one 
unit. This is because the number of rated and unrated firms in our sample differs and is 
uneven among the countries. To avoid uneven sample distribution we have decided not to 
make comparisons between the different countries but instead make a joint conclusion 
about the BRIC unit.  
 
 
Table 2. Country distribution of the sample. 
 
3.3 Research method and variables 
To be able to investigate how credit ratings affect the choice of payment method in M&A 
we will try to differentiate the qualitative nature of the choice of payment by using a 
probit regression. The probit regression is a nonlinear model based on cumulative normal 
distribution and allows us to focus on the qualitative decision whether firms pay with 
primarily cash or stock. The regression is the cumulative distribution function for a 
standard normally distributed variable and effectively transforms the model to ensure that 
the fitted probabilities will lie between 0 and 1. The fitted regression model will therefore 
take an S-shape rather than a straight line (Brooks, 2008). The formula is the following:  
 
𝐹(𝑧𝑖) =
1
𝜎√2𝜋
𝑒
−
1
2
(
𝑧𝑖
2
𝜎
)
        (1) 
 
The probit regression computes the parameters by using the maximum likelihood 
estimator (Karampatsas et al., 2014). In the probit regression the dependent variable is a 
dummy variable and as a result, our dependent variable payment method will take the 
26 35 
53 
180 
Brazil Russia India China
Country distribution 
 20 
value of 1 for cash dominated deals and the value of 0 for stock dominated deals. We 
investigate the acquirer’s credit rating existence relation to the choice of payment method 
by controlling for different firm-specific and deal-specific characteristics. Karampatsas et 
al. (2014) use two dependent variables in their study, payment method and fraction of 
cash. However, our dependent variable of interest is solely payment method. This 
adjustment had to be made due to lack of information of the correct percentage of cash 
used in the acquisitions. We were only able to see if the deals were cash dominated or 
stock dominated, i.e. if more than 50 % of the deal was paid with cash or stock 
respectively.  
 
In order to explain the relationship between credit rating and choice of payment we will 
conduct a regression with variables inspired by Karampatsas et al. (2014).  Credit rating 
existence is the main explanatory variable. It is an independent variable that is not 
affected by other measures and is used to explain the dependent variable (Brooks, 2008). 
The variable is expected to be exogenous and decided outside the model. This is a 
dummy variable taking the value of 1 for rated acquirers and 0 for unrated acquirers. Our 
sample consists of credit ratings from the three largest credit rating agencies: Standard & 
Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch. The credit rating scale can be found in appendix 8.2.  
 
In order to investigate the relationship between the choice of payment method in M&A 
and credit ratings impact, a number of firm-specific and deal-specific characteristics will 
be used in our regression as control variables. These are constant and explanatory 
variables (Brooks, 2008). The first control variable is size, which affect the debt capacity. 
It is measured as the natural logarithm of the market capitalisation four weeks prior 
announcement to the deal. Size affects the debt capacity of firms due to the 
characteristics that come with size. A smaller firm has fewer possibilities than a large 
diversified firm to raise debt due to being riskier and likelier to default (Karampatsas et 
al., 2014). Moreover, studies have shown that the characteristics of smaller firms make 
them more prone to using cash rather than equity for payment of acquisitions (Moeller et 
al., 2003). 
  
The second control variable is book-to-market which is used as a proxy for growth 
opportunities. It is measured as the ratio of the book value of equity at the fiscal year-end 
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prior to the deal announcement to the market value of equity four weeks prior to the 
acquisition announcement. Growth opportunities are considered in terms of investment 
opportunities and there exists the issue of over- and underinvestment. According to 
Karampatsas et al. (2014) the issue of underinvestment associated with growth 
opportunities make firms more prone to use stock financing in order to avoid the issue. 
Nonetheless the authors expect the variable to correspond to a positive relationship to the 
use of cash.  
  
Additionally, we will use collateral as a variable, which according to Faccio and Masulis 
(2005) is a proxy for debt capacity. The collateral, calculated in terms of tangible assets, 
accounts for to what extent firms can use cash financing. On the other hand, Karampatsas 
et al. (2014) rely on credit ratings for this proxy. Faccio and Masulis (2005) found that 
bidders that offer a majority of cash also have a higher percentage of collateral than 
bidders that pay with a majority of stocks. The variable is measured as the ratio of 
property, plant and equipment to the book value of total assets at the end of the fiscal year 
prior to the acquisition announcement. Firms with a higher ratio of tangible assets are 
exposed to more opportunities of financing thanks to being able to borrow more from 
financial institutions in terms of loans and bonds and are expected to be positively 
correlated to firms’ debt level (Hovakimian et al., 2001).   
  
Another variable that is included in the regression is leverage. It is measured as the ratio 
of a firm’s total debt to the book value of assets in the end of the fiscal year prior 
acquisition announcement and accounts as another proxy for measuring debt capacity. 
Moreover, leverage accounts for the financial condition of the firm, however studies have 
shown different results on the effect of leverage on the choice of financing. Harford et al. 
(2009) believe in a positive relationship between leverage and cash financing, i.e. it is 
more probable that a firm with leverage chooses cash financing, while Faccio and 
Masulis (2005) predict the opposite. 
  
Following from the pecking order theory, the fifth variable is cash flows to assets. The 
variable is defined as the ratio of EBIT plus depreciation minus total dividends divided 
by total assets in the end of the fiscal year before the acquisition date. Stated in the 
original study by Jensen (1986) and according to the free cash flow hypothesis the usage 
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of cash in acquisitions is more likely when managers have excessive amounts of cash in 
their firms. Hence, the controlling for cash flows to assets and the anticipated relationship 
between cash financing and the variable is positive. 
  
The number of analysts that have tracked and assisted the bidding firm is the sixth 
variable and is supposed to control for information asymmetry. The increasing number of 
analysts reduces information asymmetry in the equity market (Chemmanur et al., 2009). 
The degree of information asymmetry is highly likely to affect the target firm in an 
acquisition as it might reveal the true value of the bidding firm, which might be over- or 
undervalued. Since previous research implicates that emerging markets have higher 
information asymmetry, among them Salter (1998) and Palepu et al. (2005), it is 
interesting to see if this variable have the same effect as in the study by Karampatsas et 
al. (2014).  
  
The seventh variable is relative size. It is defined as the value of the transaction divided 
by bidder market value of equity four weeks prior to the acquisition. As the size of the 
transaction increases with the size of the target firm the likelihood of cash financing 
decreases as it becomes harder to raise cash due to the large deal size (Karampatsas et al., 
2014).  
  
Diversifying deals, which is a dummy variable taking 0 for acquisitions within the same 
industry, cover the eight variable. Faccio and Masulis (2005) argue that firms in unrelated 
industries should be more reluctant to accept stock as a payment method due to 
information asymmetry and primarily because of bidder’s overvaluation risk. The 
industry is determined by matching the bidder and target industry description.   
  
Moreover, the regression encompasses a control variable to see if the target is private or 
public. It is a dummy variable taking 1 for private targets and 0 for public targets. The 
variable functions as a proxy on the ownership structure of the shareholders in the target 
firm. According to the results from Faccio and Masulis (2005), bidders’ payment method 
choice on private target firms is more likely to be cash. On the contrary, acquisitions of 
public target firms are more likely to be financed through stocks. 
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The tenth and final control variable presented is run-up and is used to measure stocks 
overvaluation. It is the bidder’s market adjusted buy-and-hold returns over the period     
(-205, -6) days prior announcement. The likelihood of using stock financing generally 
increase when bidding firms are expected to be overvalued in comparison to their target 
firms. This behaviour could be explained by market timing hypothesis (Vermaelen and 
Xu, 2014).  
 
Some of the variables used by Karampatsas et al. (2014) have to be excluded in our 
regression due to lack of data. As mentioned above, the second dependent variable 
fraction of cash is excluded from our study due to lack of data. We could only see if the 
M&A was stock dominated or cash dominated, i.e. paid with more than 50 % cash or 
more than 50 % stocks. Moreover, the control variables interest rate spread, competition, 
tender and block ownership are excluded in our sample due to lack of data. All of the 
deals covered in this thesis are friendly and therefore the variable hostile is excluded.  
 
3.4 Regressions 
Based on the method description above, the regression we are going to perform is the 
following: 
 Prob(payment_method=1) = F(α + β1credit_rating + β2lnsize + 
β3book_to_market + β4collateral + β5leverage + β7cash_flow_to_assets + 
β8number_of_analysts + β9relative_size + β10diversifying_deals + β11private + 
β12runup + ε) 
 
3.5 Limitations of regression  
There are several limitations to take into consideration when performing a probit 
regression. First of all, to be able to run the regressions the explanatory variables cannot 
be highly correlated to each other or to the error term. If the explanatory variables are 
very highly correlated a problem known as multicollinearity occurs. There exist two 
classes of multicollinearity: perfect multicollinearity and near multicollinearity (Brooks, 
2008). The first problem occurs when there is an exact relationship between two or more 
variables. Near multicollinearity arise when there is a non-negligible relationship 
between two or more variables and occurs more often when there is a small sample. The 
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problem does not affect R-squared in the regression output but instead often results in 
high standard errors among the individual coefficients (Brooks, 2008). In order to test for 
multicollinearity, Brooks (2008) suggests a correlation matrix for the independent 
variables. The author suggests that a correlation value over 0,8 can lead to 
multicollinearity in the model. We have performed a correlation matrix in EViews, which 
can be found in appendix 8.3. In our correlation matrix we did not find any correlation 
over 0,8 among the independent variables and therefore expect our results to be reliable.  
 
Additionally, Huber-White heteroskedasticity is used in our regression to correct standard 
errors and adjust for acquire clustering due to the repeated acquirers in our sample. By 
using the correction, the hypothesis testing will be more careful and require additional 
evidence against the null hypothesis before it is rejected (Brooks, 2008). Furthermore, the 
existence of outliers needs to be examined and removed in order to perform a regression 
without disorders. Outliers do not fit in with the pattern of the rest of the data and 
therefore they need to be removed to avoid disturbance in the model. We did not find any 
extreme outliers in our sample and thus did not have to reduce our sample. Moreover, our 
sample size is smaller than in the study by Karampatsas et al. (2014). As a result, the 
outcome from a larger sample could have been different and more representative.  
 
The greatest limitation of our study is the exclusion of the regression on the effect of 
credit rating level on the choice of payment method. We could not perform the regression 
as planned. The reason why we could not perform the regression depends on the lack of 
diversity in our sample. Nearly all of the rated firms in our sample use cash financing as a 
method of payment while solely four firms use stock payment as financing method. The 
results are however still interesting as the sample and distribution of choice of payment 
method illustrate a clear pattern of cash financing among rated firms.  
 
3.6 Validity and reliability  
Reliability measures how any measuring technique yields the consistent findings on 
repeated trials (Bryman & Bell, 2005). The methodology used in this thesis is inspired by 
Karampatsas et al. (2014) and is therefore previously tested for the purpose we aim to 
study. Furthermore, the data used in our study is solely secondary from well-established 
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databases. The data is publicly available information, which makes it more reliable and 
easy to access. All of the databases we use are well known and used by researchers and 
labour within the financial industry, therefore the data used in our sample is expected to 
be highly reliable for the purpose of this thesis. The M&A activity and deal 
characteristics are collected from Zephyr, which is well established and the most 
comprehensive database of M&A deals. The credit ratings are collected from Thomson 
Reuters Eikon, which is a database with trusted content. The accounting data is collected 
from Datastream and Capital IQ, also trusted databases.  
 
Validity refers to verifying that the measurement used in the study actually measures 
what it aims to measure and nothing else. Validity is distinguished into internal and 
external validity (Bryman & Bell, 2005). To be able to draw conclusions from the 
findings both the internal and external validity need to be strong. The internal validity is 
concerned with a causal relationship between two variables, i.e. the two variables affect 
each other and are not affected by a third variable. We believe that the internal validity in 
the data and method is strong. The methodology we use to test the relationship has been 
used for the same purpose in previous literature. We add control variables to the 
regression to account for additional factors that might influence the dependent variable. 
External validity, on the other hand, refers to whether the results can be generalized 
beyond the specific study context (Bryman & Bell, 2005). In our sample this would refer 
to if the chosen BRIC unit is representative for other countries as well, specifically 
emerging markets. As mentioned earlier, we have included the four countries 
representing a majority of GDP in emerging markets and we therefore believe that these 
countries represent emerging markets well. Regulations, governance and transparency are 
however very different in many of emerging countries. 
 
3.7 Endogeneity 
The credit ratings are so far in the regression treated as exogenous, i.e. the decision 
whether to obtain a credit rating is randomly distributed among the sample firms. 
However, Harford and Uysal (2014) argue that companies partially decide whether to 
obtain a credit rating or have a higher credit rating level based on the benefits considered 
in comparison to the costs. Hence, the results implicates that the company decides to 
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obtain a credit rating based on firm-specific characteristics. As a result, there is a risk of 
an endogeneity problem. An endogeneity problem arises when potential unobserved 
variables affect both the dependent and explanatory variables, i.e. there might exist a 
correlation between the dependent variable and the error term. There exist two types of 
endogeneity issues, omitted variable problem and selection bias. The omitted variable is, 
as indicated by its name, an omitted variable that might have influenced the dependent 
variable. The self-selection, or sample selection, bias arises due to reasons affecting the 
credit ratings firms receive such as whether they solicit a rating or not (Brooks, 2008).  
 
Karampatsas et al. (2014) use different instrumental variables in order to control for 
endogeneity problems. The instrumental variables are not correlated with the dependent 
variable but are still variables that affect the likelihood of bidders to hold a rating. In this 
thesis, we include regulated industry, industry profitability and industry risk as 
instrumental variables. The industry is defined based on the industry description of the 
bidder and the target. The regulated industry variable is a dummy variable taking 1 for a 
utility or financial firm and 0 if not. Studies have shown that firms in regulated industries 
are more prone to use financing from public capital markets (Karampatsas et al., 2014). 
Their financial choices and costs become public, their agency costs are reduced and put 
together these factors affect the rating they receive. The instrumental variable industry 
profitability is calculated using EBITDA to total assets in the industry group. The 
industry profitability needs to be controlled for as the credit market prefer players in less 
volatile industries that are considered safe and preferably with large and consistent cash 
flows (Johnson, 1997; Cantillo & Wright, 2000). To measure the impact of credit risk, the 
standard deviation of the industry’s profitability is used and results in the variable 
industry risk. Furthermore, Karampatsas et al. (2014) use industry fraction as an 
instrumental variable. However, the instrumental variable industry fraction is excluded in 
this thesis due to lack of data.  
 
To control for the variable credit rating existence endogeneity in our model, we will 
conduct a Hausman test and a two-stage least square (TSLS) regression with the 
instrumental variables. In both of these tests we will test the null hypothesis that it exists 
no endogeneity problem in the sample. The Hausman test is the reduced form of the 
regression. In this model, the variable credit rating existence is treated as the dependent 
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variable, followed by control variables and lastly instrumental variables. The residuals 
from the reduced form of the regression are then saved. The next step is to perform a 
structural probit regression. In this step, payment method is the dependent variable. The 
independent variables used in this regression are the same as in the original probit 
regression except for one addition variable. The additional variable is the residuals from 
the reduced form of the regression and these are now called residual rating. If the variable 
residual rating is significant then we can reject the null hypothesis.     
 
The TSLS regression is performed in a similar way. The regression can be explained as 
running two OLS regressions separately (Brooks, 2008). The first step of the TSLS 
regression is the reduced regression. In this step, the credit rating existence variable is 
treated as the dependent variable. The control variables and the instrumental variables are 
treated as independent variables. The residuals from the first step are saved and used in 
the second step as an additional variable called residual rating. The second stage is 
referred to as the structural TSLS regression. In this step, the dependent variable is 
payment method and the independent variables are the control variables with the 
additional variable residual rating. If the variable residual rating is significant then we can 
reject the null hypothesis.  
4. Empirical results 
4.1 Descriptive data 
Total sample 
As mentioned in the “Data selection criteria” chapter the final number of observations 
amounted to 294 acquisitions. Out of these acquisitions, 53 covered rated bidding firms. 
The descriptive information on the entire sample is illustrated in table 3 and 5, 256 out of 
the observations were financed with a minimum of 50 % cash. The rest, 38 acquisitions, 
were financed mainly through stock financing. The mean and median size of the entire 
sample is $6,2bn and approximately 96 % of the target firms are privately held. This also 
suggests the reason to the lack of information on firm characteristics of the target firms 
that we encountered, as the access to information is limited for unlisted firms. The 
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median number of analysts following the bidding firms in our sample is three however; 
this number increases for cash financed and rated firms.  
 
  Total sample     
  Total sample (N=294)   
        
Variable  Mean  Median   
        
Bidder Characteristics 
    
% Rating Existence 18%  -   
Size (in million USD) 6152 765   
Leverage  0,264 0,274   
Book-to-market 0,721 0,320   
Collateral  0,383 0,371   
Run-up 1,830 0,850   
Cash flow to assets 0,007 0,084   
Number of analysts 9,289 3   
        
Deal characteristics 
      
Relative size 51,9 10,0   
% Diversifying Deals 18%  -   
% Private 96%  -   
        
        
Table 3. Descriptive data of the total sample. 
Cash versus stock financed deals 
Out of the 256 deals that were financed with cash about 19 % possessed a credit rating. 
The average credit rating level of the cash financed firms in the data sample translates to 
a BB rating in S&P including Fitch and Ba2 in Moody’s rating system. These credit 
rating levels correspond to speculative grades. The highest credit rating level corresponds 
to A- in S&P and Fitch and A3 at Moody’s at investment grade. The lowest credit rating 
level corresponds to the speculative grade B- at S&P and Fitch including B3 at Moody’s. 
The complete rating distribution and rating scale is illustrated in table 4. Among the 38 
stock financed deals about 11 % of the bidders have credit ratings and the interval in 
which the credit rating levels exists is between BB+ (S&P and Fitch) and Ba1 (Moody’s) 
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respectively BBB- (S&P and Fitch) and Baa3 (Moody’s). These ratings correspond 
subsequently each to speculative grade and investment grade.  
 
 
Table 4. Distribution of ratings among the firms. 
 
The descriptive data of the sample on method of payment is presented in table 5. The 
average size of the firms that dominantly use cash financing is $5,8bn while the size of 
the firms that preferably use stock financing is $8,2bn. The book-to-market of the bidding 
firms varies a lot between cash financed and stock financed deals. The mean is less for 
cash financed deals whilst the median is approximately the same. The average size of the 
collateral is larger in cash financed deals rather than stock financed deals and this 
relationship applies to the leverage variable as well meaning that bidders in cash financed 
deals are more leveraged than bidders in stock financed acquisitions. Another quite 
expected outcome is the cash flows to assets of the firms, which seemingly is higher in 
cash, financed deals than stock financed. There are also a greater number of analysts 
following the firms using cash rather than stock as financing method. The difference in 
relative size is significant. Relative size, meaning the ratio between deal values to the 
market value of bidder, illustrates that stock financed deals seem to have higher deal 
values. The bidders and targets seem more likely to be in the same industry in cash 
financed deals rather than stock financed. Overall, the results show that the majority of 
the deals are made within the same industry. Solely 17 % and 23 % of the deals are made 
inter-industry, for cash financed and stock financed respectively. The descriptive 
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information also show that almost all target firms in the deals, no matter financing 
method, are privately held. The run-up variable is much lower in cash financed deals 
rather than stock financed. 
 
   Method of Payment    
    
  
 
Cash (N=256) 
 
Stock (N=38)   
              
Variable  Mean  Median   Mean  Median   
              
Bidder Characteristics 
            
% Rating Existence 19%  -   11%  -   
Size (in million USD) 5850 826   8189 619   
Leverage  0,271 0,279   0,216 0,178   
Book-to-market 0,655 0,321   1,163 0,300   
Collateral  0,390 0,382   0,333 0,274   
Run-up 0,947 0,402   7,782 5,814   
Cash flows to Assets 0,086 0,089   -0,530 0,061   
Number of Analysts 9,672 4   6,711 2   
              
Deal Characteristics 
            
Relative Size 33,6 9,3   52,3 18,9   
% Diversifying Deals 17%  -   24%  -   
% Private 95%  -   97%  -   
              
              
Table 5. Descriptive data of the method of payment. 
With and without rating 
The descriptive information of rated and unrated firms can be found in table 6. Out of the 
total sample of deals solely 53 biddings firms are rated, hence there are 241 unrated 
bidders. The rated bidders range between investment grade and speculative grade with an 
average of the speculative grade BB- (S&P and Fitch) and Ba3 (Moody’s). The firm size 
is calculated as the market value of the bidding firms, of the unrated bidders is lower than 
the firm size of rated firms. However, the book-to-market variable differs less between 
rated and unrated bidders and the latter group seem to have a higher book-to-market. This 
means that in general, over the acquisitions made in the BRIC countries during our time 
frame, the market value of unrated acquirers is lower than the book value of equity. This 
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indicates higher growth opportunities in deals made by firms without rating. Similar to 
cash financed deals mentioned above rated firms have higher collateral and leverage level 
than firms without ratings. The median percentage of tangible assets to total assets in 
rated bidders is 53 % whilst the number is 34 % for unrated firms. The ratio of cash flows 
to assets of the firms is much higher in firms that are rated. Seemingly rated firms also 
have higher cash flows to assets than firms involved in cash financed acquisitions. The 
number of analysts is many more in rated firms rather than unrated firms. 
  
Similar to cash financed and stock financed firms there are a significant difference in 
relative size between rated and unrated firms. Unrated firms have higher value on relative 
size meaning that these acquiring firms choose targets with greater deal value than 
themselves. The variable diversifying deals tells us that 89 % respectively 81 % out of the 
deals made by rated and unrated firms are made within the same industry. As was 
suggested by the entire sample most of the target firms are private. Among the rated 
bidders 98 % are private deals and out of the unrated bidding firms 95 % are private 
targets.  
 
Most importantly the number of deals that were cash financed by rated firms is 93 %. The 
credit rating level varied between A- and B- in S&P and Fitch and between A3 and B3 
according to Moody’s scale. However, the credit rating level seems to be of no interest in 
the choice of payment as the majority of the deals from rated firms, no matter the credit 
rating level, seemingly prefer cash financing over stock financing.  
 
  With Credit Rating    Without Credit Rating    
  With Credit Rating (N=53)   Without Credit Rating (N=241) 
              
Variable  Mean  Median   Mean  Median   
              
Bidder Characteristics             
Size (in million USD) 26215 13860   1740 493   
Leverage  0,301 0,310   0,255 0,251   
Book-to-market 0,868 0,289   0,689 0,331   
Collateral  0,504 0,532   0,356 0,343   
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Run-up -0,060 0,606   2,246 1,275   
Cash flows to Assets 0,149 0,157   -0,025 0,073   
Number of Analysts 21,283 21   6,651 2   
              
Deal Characteristics             
Relative Size 5,4 1,2   60,6 15,6   
% Diversifying Deals 11%  -   19%  -   
% Private 98%  -   95%  -   
% Cash Payment 93%  -   86%  -   
              
Table 6. Descriptive data of firms with credit ratings and without credit ratings. 
4.2 Probit regression 
The result of the probit regression is presented in table 7. The probit regression of the 
total sample did not find a significant relationship between credit rating existence and the 
choice of payment method. However, several of our control variables showed a 
significant relationship to the payment method. Relative size and the dummy variable 
private were significant on a 5 % significance level. Relative size has a negative impact 
on payment method and therefore indicates that the larger the value of the deal size is in 
relation to the market value of the acquirer, the more likely the acquirer is to use stock as 
a payment method. Also, the dummy variable private has a negative impact on the choice 
of payment method. This indicates that if the target is a private firm then the bidder is 
more likely to use stock as payment method.  
 
Cash flows to asset and run-up are even more explanatory and are significant on a 1 % 
significant level. The variable cash flows to assets has a positive impact on the choice of 
payment method which indicates that firms holding high amounts of cash are more likely 
to use cash as payment method when performing an M&A. Run-up has a negative 
influence on the choice of payment method. This indicates that the more a firm’s stock 
price increases in the period prior to the announcement of the M&A, the more likely the 
firm is to use stock as payment method.  
 
McFadden’s R-squared is 17,5 % for the regression. This is a measure of the fraction of 
the total variability of the results that is captured by the model. McFadden’s R-squared 
ranges from 0 to 1 and the closer to 1 the ratio is, the more likely that the outcome would 
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happen (Brooks, 2008). 17,5 % is therefore considered rather low and indicates that the 
model does not explain the dependent variable very well. The relatively low rate could be 
the outcome of a small sample. However, many variables are proven to be significant on 
a high level, which makes the results more reliable.   
 
  Total sample       
          
  Probit regression       
    
 
P-value   
Constant  1,260   0,306   
  (1,23)       
Rating Existence -0,270   0,473   
  (0,376)       
Ln (Size) 0,048   0,583   
  (0,087)       
Book-to-market -0,007   0,678   
  (0,018)       
Collateral 0,669   0,253   
  (0,585)       
Leverage 0,868   0,236   
  (0,733)       
Cash Flows to Assets 0,138 *** 0,001   
  (0,042)       
Number of Analysts 0,005   0,716   
  (0,014)       
Relative Size -0,001 ** 0,015   
  (0,000)       
Diversifying Deals -0,327   0,195   
  (-1,297)       
Private Target -0,932 ** 0,015   
  (0,381)       
Run-up -0,035 *** 0,001   
  (0,010)       
N 294       
McFadden R-squared 0,175       
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Table 7. Results from the probit regression. The symbols *, ** and * represent statistical 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The standard deviations are reported in 
parentheses. 
4.3 Endogeneity control 
As mentioned in the methodology chapter, an endogeneity control must be made in order 
to examine whether the dependent variable solely depends on firm-specific 
characteristics. For the test of endogeneity control we performed a Hausman test and a 
TSLS regression, where we included the instrumental variables in the estimations.  
 
The results from the Hausman test are illustrated in table 8 and 9. First of all, the results 
from the reduced regression show that none of the instrumental variables have any 
significant result and thus no impact on the credit rating existence variable. Secondly, in 
the structural probit regression, the variable residual rating does not culminate in a 
significant results, which indicates that we fail to reject the null hypothesis of that there 
exist no endogeneity problem in the model. The instrumental variables we used to test for 
endogeneity could therefore not explain if the variable credit rating existence is 
endogenous.   
 
  Total sample       
          
  Reduced regression        
    
 
P-value   
Constant  -15,050 *** 0,000   
  (2,549)       
Rating Existence         
          
Residual Rating         
          
Regulated Industry -0,109   0,739   
  (0,327)       
Industry Profitability 1,236   0,502   
  (1,843)       
Industry Risk 3,061   0,317   
  (3,062)       
Ln (Size) 0,772 *** 0,000   
  (0,156)       
Book-to-market 0,003   0,819   
  (0,013)       
Collateral 0,693   0,358   
  (0,754)       
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Leverage 1,573   0,139   
  (1,062)       
Cash Flows to Assets 0,050 * 0,073   
  (0,028)       
Number of Analysts 0,028 ** 0,031   
  (0,013)       
Relative Size -0,021 ** 0,014   
  (0,008)       
Diversifying Deals 0,619685   0,246   
  (0,562)       
Private Target 1,454 ** 0,021   
  (0,631)       
Run-up -0,041 * 0,061   
  (0,022)       
          
N 294       
McFadden R-squared 0,64       
          
          
Table 8. Results from the reduced regression. The symbols *, ** and * represent statistical 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The standard deviations are reported in 
parentheses.   
 
 
  Total sample       
          
  Structural probit regression       
    
 
P-value   
Constant  1,125   0,464   
  (1,537)       
Rating Existence -0,392   0,568   
  (0,688)       
Residual Rating 0,198   0,835   
  (0,951)       
Regulated Industry         
          
Industry Profitability         
          
Industry Risk         
          
Ln (Size) 0,056   0,603   
  (0,108)       
Book-to-market -0,007   0,676   
  (0,018)       
Collateral 0,699   0,244   
  (0,601)       
Leverage 0,894   0,213   
  (0,717)       
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Cash Flows to Assets 0,139 *** 0,001   
  (0,043)       
Number of Analysts 0,006   0,620   
  (0,013)       
Relative Size -0,001 ** 0,016   
  (0,000)       
Diversifying Deals -0,323   0,203   
  (0,253)       
Private Target -0,924 ** 0,016   
  (0,385)       
Run-up -0,035 *** 0,001   
  (0,010)       
          
N 294       
McFadden R-squared 0,175       
          
 
        
Table 9. Results from the structural probit regression. The symbols *, ** and * represent 
statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The standard deviations are 
reported in parentheses. 
 
Moreover, we performed a TSLS regression to see if the null hypothesis could be 
rejected. The results of the TSLS regression are presented in table 10 and 11. Firstly, the 
reduced regression demonstrates that the instrumental variable industry profitability is 
significant on a 5 % significance level, which indicates that this variable affect the 
dependent variable credit rating existence. In the second stage however, the results did 
not provide any evidence that the variable credit rating existence is endogenous. The 
overall results are similar to the structural probit regression. Ultimately, after controlling 
for endogeneity bias in both of these models we did not receive any significant results, 
which indicates that we fail to reject the null hypothesis that there is no endogeneity 
problem in the sample with the instrumental variables we used.  
 
 
  Total sample       
          
  Reduced regression        
    
 
P-value   
Constant  -1,639 *** 0,000   
  (0,174)       
Rating Existence         
          
Residual Rating         
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Regulated Industry 0,013   0,782   
  (0,048)       
Industry Profitability 0,735 ** 0,016   
  (0,302)       
Industry Risk 0,591   0,130   
  (0,389)       
Ln (Size) 0,098 *** 0,000   
  (0,012)       
Book-to-market -0,001   0,847   
  (0,004)       
Collateral 0,114   0,189   
  (0,087)       
Leverage 0,170   0,121   
  (0,109)       
Cash Flows to Assets 0,012   0,315   
  (0,012)       
Number of Analysts 0,007 *** 0,000   
  (0,002)       
Relative Size 0,0000   0,829   
  (0,000)       
Diversifying Deals 0,044   0,328   
  (0,083)       
Private Target 0,181 ** 0,029   
  (0,091)       
Run-up -0,002   0,329   
  (0,002)       
  
 
      
N 294       
R-squared 0,48       
Adjusted R-squared 0,46       
          
Table 10. Results from the reduced TSLS regression. The symbols *, ** and * represent 
statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The standard deviations are 
reported in parentheses. 
 
   
  Total sample       
          
  
Structural TSLS 
regression       
    
 
P-value   
Constant  1,321 ** 0,033   
  (0,618)       
Rating Existence 0,283   0,451   
  (0,375)       
Residual Rating -0,334   0,382   
  (0,382)       
Regulated Industry         
          
Industry         
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Profitability 
          
Industry Risk         
          
Ln (Size) -0,028   0,486   
  (0,040)       
Book-to-market -0,002   0,726   
  (0,005)       
Collateral 0,041   0,713   
  (0,112)       
Leverage 0,126   0,355   
  (0,136)       
Cash Flows to 
Assets 0,032 ** 0,026   
  (0,014)       
Number of Analysts -0,001   0,742   
  (0,004)       
Relative Size 0,000 *** 0,000   
  (0,000)       
Diversifying Deals -0,063   0,220   
  (0,051)       
Private Target -0,112   0,318   
  (0,111)       
Run-up -0,007 *** 0,002   
  (0,010)       
          
N 294       
R-squared 0,16       
Adjusted R-
squared 0,13       
          
Table 11. Results from the structural TSLS regression. The symbols *, ** and * represent 
statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The standard deviations are 
reported in parentheses. 
5. Analysis 
5.1 Analysis of the results  
Generally our results are in line with the results of Karampatsas et al. (2014), however 
there are some differences that need to be considered. A possible explanation to the 
differences is that this thesis covers another market where the most common credit rating 
level of the rated acquirers is speculative grade. This is in line with literature suggesting 
that firms in emerging markets tend to receive lower credit ratings than firms in 
developed sovereigns. Credit rating agencies tend to provide firms with credit rating 
levels not exceeding the sovereigns’ credit rating level and supposedly this is a larger 
issue in emerging markets where the sovereigns’ receive lower ratings in general 
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(Borensztein et al., 2007). However, as no regression was possible to perform on the 
effect from credit rating level on the choice of payment, no valid analysis or conclusion 
can be drawn on the effect of credit rating level. Although, the sample illustrates strong 
numbers indicating that the most common choice of method is cash, regardless of credit 
rating level.  
 
Out of the entire sample of M&A included in this thesis, 87 % were performed with cash 
as payment method. This is in line with the study of Chinese companies by Chi et al. 
(2011) where cash was also the preferred payment choice. The majority of firms in our 
sample are Chinese firms, which could have had an impact on the choice of cash as 
payment method. The dominant choice of payment method in our sample is however the 
opposite of Karampatsas et al. (2014) who found that the U.S. market use slightly more 
stock financed than cash financed deals. Emerging markets are expected to have higher 
information asymmetry due to lack of transparency than more developed countries 
(Salter, 1998; Palepu et al., 2005). Our sample statistics therefore contradict previous 
findings that higher information asymmetry lead to that firms hold less cash and as a 
result use stock financed deals under such circumstances (Drobetz et al., 2009; Zhu & 
Jog, 2009).   
 
According to the descriptive information rated firms seem to be larger and more 
leveraged than unrated firms. This correspond to the findings of Faulkender and Petersen 
(2006) that rated firms have access to public bond markets and therefore have more 
leverage in their capital structure compared to unrated firms. Furthermore, rated firms 
possess more cash flows than unrated firms and rated firms almost exclusively use cash 
as financing method. This is in line with the theory of the Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow 
hypothesis. Cash financed deals include bidders that are likely to have more collateral 
and leverage than stock financed deals which is opposite to what Faccio and Masulis 
(2005) found and more in line with Harford et al. (2009). Additionally, the descriptive 
information indicates that rated firms are more profitable but unrated firms seem to have 
more growth opportunities.  
  
Unlike Karampatsas et al. (2014) we find differences in the number of analysts following 
firms in cash and stock financed deals. However, similar to Karampatsas et al. (2014) 
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rated firms are followed by more analysts than unrated firms. Moreover, rated firms have 
public credit worthiness thanks to the credit rating agencies, which mitigate the 
information asymmetry issue. The information asymmetry literature is coherent with the 
fact that the number of analysts following the firms is larger in cash financing firms (Zhu 
& Jog, 2009). Palepu et al. (2005) suggest that firms in emerging markets tend to lack 
financial analysts and hence have bigger issues with information asymmetry than firms in 
developed markets. However notably, in comparison to Karampatsas et al. (2014) this 
thesis presents on average a higher number of analysts.  
 
Finally, there seems to be a trend showing that most firms are acquired within the same 
industry and the target firm seems to most commonly be private. This suggests that firms 
are more eager to invest in an area of which they are familiar to. Moreover, stock 
financed deals seem to include larger deal relative to the bidding firm value in 
comparison to cash financed deals.  
 
In order to draw any conclusions about the indicators of the choice of payment method 
we need to interpret the results from the regressions. We tested the constructed 
hypothesis if rated firms are more likely to pay with cash in order to answer our research 
question whether credit ratings affect payment method in emerging markets. Similar to 
Karampatsas et al. (2014) we did not find any significant relationship that credit rating 
existence affects the choice of payment method. As a result, we fail to reject the 
hypothesis. Therefore, our findings do not support the previous literature that credit 
ratings affect the capital structure and financial policies of firms (Bancel & Mittoo, 2003; 
Kisgen, 2007; Cursio & Baek, 2016). Even though we cannot draw any conclusions of 
the credit ratings existence effect on the choice of payment method, we found other 
variables affecting the choice of payment method in M&A.  
 
First of all, the variables private and relative size are significant on a 5 % significance 
level. Our findings indicate that if the target is a private firm then the bidder is more 
likely to use stock as payment method. Our result contradicts Karampatsas et al. (2014) 
who found that the variable private has a positive impact on the choice of payment 
method. The outcome also contradicts Faccio and Masulis (2005) that present cash 
financing as the dominantly preferred payment method for private targets. The results 
 41 
could however be explained by the information asymmetry theory. The bidder has less 
readily available information about a private target than a public target. Consequently, the 
bidder faces higher information asymmetry when acquiring a private target. Our findings 
could therefore be explained by information asymmetry and more specifically the study 
by Zhu and Jog (2009) who argue that firms use higher levels of stock payment under 
higher levels of information asymmetry.  
 
The variable relative size has a negative correlation to the dependent variable which 
indicates that the larger the value of the transaction in relation to the market value of the 
acquiring firm, the more likely the acquirer is to use stock as payment method in an 
M&A. Our findings are supported by Harford et al. (2009) who argue that if the size of 
the deal increases relative to the bidders, the likelihood of using cash is likely to decrease 
because it is harder for the bidding firm to raise more cash as the deal increases to very 
high levels. Moreover, our results are consistent with Karampatsas et al. (2014) who also 
found this variable negatively related to the use of cash in M&A. Our findings indicate 
that the relationship also holds in the BRIC countries.  
 
The two most significant variables affecting the choice of payment method in our results 
are cash flows to assets and run-up. The variable cash flows to assets has a positive effect 
on the choice of payment method which indicates that the more cash holdings a firm has, 
the more likely it is to use cash as payment method. This result is in line with the pecking 
order theory that suggests that the more internal cash holdings the more the firm will use 
to invest in new investments and the firm will avoid external financing such as debt and 
equity. Our findings are therefore supported by several studies that found evidence for the 
pecking order theory in investment decisions (Myers, 1984; Lemmon & Zenger, 2010; 
Chen, 2004; Tong and Green, 2005). According to Myers (1984), the reason why firms 
maintain financial slack is to pursue profitable projects at any time and to be able to 
finance them. Firms prefer to avoid external financing because the public do not have the 
same information about the project as the firm and therefore tend to undervalue it. 
Moreover, our findings are supported by Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow hypothesis, 
which indicates that managers with excessive free cash flow are more willing to use cash 
for their investments. Our findings therefore indicate that the pecking order theory and 
the free cash flow hypothesis also hold in the BRIC countries.  
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The variable run-up has a negative impact on the choice of payment method. This 
indicates that the more a firm’s stock price increases in the period prior to the 
announcement of the M&A, the more likely the firm is to use stock as payment method. 
The results are supported by previous literature that support the signalling theory that 
firm’s shares are overvalued when used as payment method in M&A (Myers & Majluf, 
1984; Chemmanur et al., 2009; He et al., 2011). Our findings are evidence of that the 
market timing hypothesis exists also in the BRIC countries, which according to 
Vermaelen and Xu (2014) is the outcome of a bidder trying to time the market and take 
advantage of the overvalued shares by using stock as payment method in an M&A. 
Moreover, Karampatsas et al. (2014) found evidence supporting this behaviour in the US 
market.  
 
The control variables size, collateral, book-to-market, leverage, number of analysts and 
diversifying deals were not significant in our study. Leverage, size, book-to-market and 
number of analysts were significant in the study by Karampatsas et al. (2014). The 
authors did however not find any significant results supporting the variables collateral 
and diversifying deals impact on the choice of payment method.  
 
To conclude, we did not find any significant results supporting our main hypothesis. To 
answer our research question, we did not find any results indicating that credit rating 
existence impact the choice of payment method. However, we found several other 
variables affecting the payment method, where cash flows to assets and run-up turned out 
to be the two most significant and thereby most important determinants of payment 
method. Unlike Karampatsas et al. (2014) we were unable to test if the credit rating level 
affects the choice of payment method. The rated firms were dominated by cash financed 
deals and therefore we cannot draw any conclusions whether the level of credit rating 
affects the choice of payment method. However, it is notable that nearly all of the rated 
firms choose to pay with cash. Karampatsas et al. (2014) found that credit rating level has 
a significantly positive relationship to the use of cash. We performed a Hausman test and 
a TSLS regression to control for endogeneity problems in our sample. The results were 
not significant and we can therefore not conclude that we have an endogeneity problem in 
our sample. In other words, we cannot conclude that the variable credit rating existence is 
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affected by our chosen instrumental variables or the other independent variables in the 
regression.  
 
5.2 Critical reflection  
This thesis is inspired by the study of Karampatsas et al. (2014) who evaluated the US 
market. When analysing the results it is therefore important to keep in mind that 
emerging markets differ from developed markets. Consequently, some of the variables 
used in our regressions potentially need adjustments to be more accurately applicable to 
the BRIC countries. In line with our findings the authors did not find a relationship 
between credit rating existence and the choice of payment method in the US market. 
However, the authors found evidence of other variables affecting the choice of payment 
method. For example, number of analysts was highly significant in their study and was 
negatively associated with cash. This implies that increasing number of analysts reduce 
information asymmetry in the equity market. The differences in our results imply that it 
probably exists some differences between the levels of information asymmetry in the 
BRIC countries compared to the US market. The variable number of analysts possibly did 
not capture the effect we seek to analyse. Since previous literature have proven that 
information asymmetry is higher in emerging markets than in more developed countries, 
the variable might not accurately capture the effects we were looking for (Salter, 1998; 
Palepu et al., 2005). Another example is the variable book-to-market. Karampatsas et al. 
(2014) found the variable highly significant. We expected the variable to be significant as 
it is a ratio for growth opportunities and emerging markets have fast growing 
characteristics. This ratio might however need adjustments or be replaced with another 
variable to result in a more significant outcome. 
 
The sample characteristics made it difficult to make a comparison between the four 
different countries in our sample. Some of the countries had more rated firms than others 
and the proportion of rated firms in each country would not have been representative for 
a comparison. We have therefore chosen to study the four countries as one unit. There are 
however differences in regulations, governance and transparency in the BRIC countries 
and a larger and more diverse sample could have resulted in a different outcome.  
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6. Conclusion  
In this thesis we investigate whether credit rating existence affects the choice of payment 
method when a firm performs a merger and acquisition in the BRIC countries. The study 
is inspired by the work of Karampatsas et al. (2014). The aim is to contribute to already 
existing literature that covers the subject by investigating emerging markets and more 
specifically Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRIC). Hence, our results add evidence 
from parts of emerging markets to already existing published research that only cover 
developed markets.  
 
Through the use and analysis of a probit regression, our empirical findings did not find 
any significant results supporting the relationship between credit rating existence and the 
choice of payment method. The dependent variable payment method was controlled for 
by using the explanatory variable credit rating existence and several other independent 
variables. Even though our findings did not show a significant result supporting credit 
ratings impact, other determinants proved to be important when a firm decides on the 
choice of payment method. Cash flows to assets and run-up turned out to be the most 
significant determinants of the choice of payment method. The results indicate that 
Jensen’s free cash flow hypothesis, pecking order theory and the market timing 
hypothesis hold also in the BRIC countries. Moreover, the variables relative size and 
private target showed significant results. The results from the variables cash flows to 
assets, run-up and relative size are all supported by previous findings covering the choice 
of payment method in M&A. However, the variable private target showed a negative 
impact on the choice of payment method, which contradicts previous findings. Our 
results could however be explained by the higher information asymmetry a firm faces 
when acquiring a private target. Moreover, almost all of the rated firms in the sample use 
cash as payment method.  
 
Generally, our findings are supported by previous literature and since the BRIC countries 
represent a majority of the GDP in emerging markets we draw the conclusion that the 
outcome of our study is applicable for the remaining emerging markets.  
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6.1 Limitations and suggestions for further studies 
The aim of this thesis is to fill a research gap by contributing to existing literature with a 
study on the uncovered topic emerging markets. However in doing so, certain limitations 
and measures had to be done. All of these limitations have already been presented, such 
as the need to cut down the original number of sample due to lack of data and the 
exclusion of certain variables in comparison to the study of Karampatsas et al. (2014). 
The focus has been on acquiring firms as opposed to the target firms, primarily because 
of lack of time but also due to the difficulty to collect and obtain data from. 
 
We believe that there are several interesting approaches that can be studied further in the 
same area of research field. There is a trend in cross-border M&A that investors from 
developed countries are increasingly investing in emerging markets. This suggests that a 
future approach could be to focus on acquirers from developed countries and target firms 
in emerging markets. On the other hand, it would also be interesting to discover if there 
are any differences when investors from emerging markets invest in developed countries. 
Moreover, including or investigating other countries from emerging markets would be an 
interesting development. 
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8. Appendix 
 
8.1 M&A activity and BRIC population 
 
Table 12. Countries included in the MSCI Emerging Markets Index (MSCI, 2016). 
 
South America Europe  Middle East and Africa Asia   
Brazil Czech Republic Egypt China Philippines 
Chile Greece Qatar India Taiwan  
Colombia Hungary South Africa Indonesia Thailand 
Mexico Poland United Arab Emirates Korea   
Peru Russia   Malaysia   
  Turkey       
          
 
 
Figure 1. The BRIC unit’s population as a percentage of the total population in emerging 
markets. The number is an average based on the years 2000-2008 and 2015 (IMF, 2016). 
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Figure 2. The BRIC unit’s M&A activity as percentage of total M&A activity in emerging 
markets during the years 2000-2008 (IMF, 2006). 
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8.2 Rating scale 
 
Table 13. Linear transformation of Standard and Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch rating systems. 
Investment grade is represented by the numbers 12-21 and speculative grade is represented by the 
numbers 1-11 in the linear scale (Soares et al., 2008). 
 
  Rating Agencies Linear  
S&P Fitch Moody's Scale 
AAA AAA Aaa 21 
AA+ AA+ Aa1 20 
AA AA Aa2 19 
AA- AA- Aa3 18 
A+ A+ A1 17 
A A A2 16 
A- A- A3 15 
BBB+ BBB+ Baa1 14 
BBB BBB Baa2 13 
BBB- BBB- Baa3 12 
BB+ BB+ Ba1 11 
BB BB Ba2 10 
BB- BB- Ba3 9 
B+ B+ B1 8 
B B B2 7 
B- B- B3 6 
CCC+ CCC+ Caa1 5 
CCC CCC Caa2 4 
CCC- CCC- Caa3 3 
CC CC Ca   
  C   2 
SD DDD C   
D DD   1 
  D     
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8.3 Correlation matrix  
Table 14. Correlation matrix. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Correlation matrix
Correlation
t-Statistic
Probability Rating existence Ln (Size) Book-to-market Collateral Leverage Cash Flows to Assets Number of Analysts Relative Size Diversifying Deals Private Target Run-up
Rating existence 1.000000
----- 
----- 
Ln (Size) 0.637948 1.000000
14.15601 ----- 
0.0000 ----- 
Book-to-market 0.016724 0.030641 1.000000
0.285822 0.523841 ----- 
0.7752 0.6008 ----- 
Collateral 0.253283 0.199115 -0.022039 1.000000
4.473984 3.472002 -0.376693 ----- 
0.0000 0.0006 0.7067 ----- 
Leverage 0.101537 -0.008082 0.069844 0.416616 1.000000
1.744078 -0.138103 1.196416 7.831124 ----- 
0.0822 0.8903 0.2325 0.0000 ----- 
Cash Flows to Assets 0.049270 -0.002362 0.010383 0.085452 0.048910 1.000000
0.842950 -0.040367 0.177429 1.465573 0.836768 ----- 
0.3999 0.9678 0.8593 0.1438 0.4034 ----- 
Number of Analysts 0.521538 0.619821 0.038985 0.156484 -0.069983 -0.005036 1.000000
10.44509 13.49678 0.666688 2.707349 -1.198808 -0.086049 ----- 
0.0000 0.0000 0.5055 0.0072 0.2316 0.9315 ----- 
Relative Size -0.119550 -0.167509 -0.004185 0.027517 -0.103244 0.012527 -0.128454 1.000000
-2.057624 -2.903414 -0.071506 0.470394 -1.773717 0.214071 -2.213361 ----- 
0.0405 0.0040 0.9430 0.6384 0.0772 0.8306 0.0276 ----- 
Diversifying Deals -0.078245 -0.196596 0.114545 0.017960 0.113452 0.026159 -0.104178 0.015765 1.000000
-1.341161 -3.426302 1.970319 0.306958 1.951269 0.447150 -1.789927 0.269423 ----- 
0.1809 0.0007 0.0497 0.7591 0.0520 0.6551 0.0745 0.7878 ----- 
Private Target 0.057826 -0.032533 0.017239 -0.043097 0.076008 -0.019201 -0.090886 -0.046387 0.012979 1.000000
0.989793 -0.556227 0.294621 -0.737126 1.302599 -0.328168 -1.559516 -0.793512 0.221808 ----- 
0.3231 0.5785 0.7685 0.4616 0.1937 0.7430 0.1200 0.4281 0.8246 ----- 
Run-up -0.091521 -0.083061 0.092839 0.105555 0.129645 -0.025922 -0.079312 0.139979 0.015246 0.018787 1.000000
-1.570504 -1.424276 1.593313 1.813850 2.234235 -0.443098 -1.359561 2.415750 0.260554 0.321086 ----- 
0.1174 0.1554 0.1122 0.0707 0.0262 0.6580 0.1750 0.0163 0.7946 0.7484 ----- 
